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We follow the behavioral equilibrium exchange rate approach by
Clark and MacDonald (1998) to derive equilibrium real eﬀective ex-
change rates and currency misalignments for the US and its 16 ma-
jor trading partners. We apply cointegration and panel cointegration
techniques to derive fully country-speciﬁc measures of misalignment
and measures based on panel estimates. We formally test the forecast
performance of pooled vs. heterogeneous estimators over a hold-back
period and ﬁnd that pooling the data delivers more accurate forecasts
in the vast majority of cases although the implicit long-run homogene-
ity restriction is statistically rejected. This is especially remarkable,
since we have given the heterogeneous estimator an ’unfair’ advan-
tage by choosing the country-speciﬁc model (of up to 21 possible ones)
with the best out-of-sample performance prior to comparing it to two
ﬁnal panel speciﬁcations. Robustness of the results is supported by
recently introduced cross-sectionally augmented panel unit root tests
by Pesaran (2007) and bootstrapped error correction-based panel coin-
tegration tests by Westerlund (2007), as well as diﬀerent estimators.
While we ﬁnd strong evidence for the Balassa-Samuelson-eﬀect, the
evidence for other commonly hypothesized fundamentals is weak.
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According to the behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) approach in-
troduced by Clark and MacDonald (1998) real (eﬀective) exchange rates are
determined by certain fundamentals such as the real interest rate diﬀeren-
tial, net foreign assets or relative productivity advances. Until the end of
the 1990s authors mostly relied on time series analysis to estimate such rela-
tionships and derive currency misalignments (among others, Faruqee, 1995,
Clark and MacDonald, 1998, and MacDonald, 1998). Recently, more authors
have taken a panel perspective (for instance Kim and Korhonen, 2005, Villav-
icencio, 2006, Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2009, and Ricci et al., 2008).1 However,
using time series techniques to estimate equilibrium exchange rates remains
popular.2
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009) ﬁnd BEER estimations to be ’quite robust’
with regard to the choice of relative productivity proxy, countries included
in the panel (G20 vs. G7, respectively non-G7 countries), the numeraire cur-
rency, and to small changes of the sample period. However, results from Mac-
Donald and Dias (2007) show that parameter estimates diﬀer substantially
across countries,3 and for each country individually, depending on whether
results are obtained from time series or panel estimations. The diﬀerences
are either attributable to true parameter heterogeneity among the countries,
to imprecise estimates due to the low number of observations in the time
series dimension, to a biased pooled estimator in the case of true parameter
heterogeneity, or most probably a combination of them.4
So, should we put more trust in the individual time series estimates or in
the pooled estimates when calculating equilibrium exchange rates and deriv-
ing currency misalignments? The answer to this question bears important
policy implications. Consider for instance the recently revitalized debates
about a possibly emerging/already existing ’currency war’. Among others,
a proper assessment whether a country’s currency is manipulated, requires
1Notable exceptions are Chinn and Johnston (1997), Chinn (2000), and Gagnon (1996)
who (also) apply panel techniques.
2More recent contributions using time series techniques include Alstadt (2010), Atsushi
(2006), Nilsson (2004), and Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2002).
3The estimated coeﬃcients for the trade balance to GDP ratio vary between -177.77
for Japan and -1.34 for the US in their study.
4In the case of true parameter heterogeneity across countries, country-speciﬁc (i.e.
heterogeneous) time series estimations are theoretically the ﬁrst choice, because the pooled
estimator is biased if the implicit (parameter) homogeneity restriction is rejected (Maddala
et al., 1997). However, if the time series are too short, estimates can be highly inaccurate
and estimated coeﬃcients be even incorrectly signed (Baltagi et al., 2008 and Maddala et
al., 1997).knowledge of the relationship between (perhaps ’manipulated’) fundamentals
and exchange rates. If the methodology used to estimate such relationships
is unreliable, we neglect an important ingredient to a well-grounded discus-
sion. A country joining a currency union is yet another example, because
a fair conversion rate for the currency needs to be established. Unreliable
estimates of the proper rate, and, as a consequence, a possibly severe cur-
rency misalignment, could unnecessarily give rise to inﬂation or deﬂation in
the accession country and even slow down economic growth in the case of
prolonged misalignments (Edwards and Savastano, 1999). Furthermore, the
fair value of a currency is not only of interest to central bankers and govern-
ment agencies, but also to the private sector (Edwards and Savastano, 1999),
since current deviations from the ’fundamentally justiﬁed’ value may serve
an information variable for future exchange rate movements.
Rapach and Wohar (2004) analyze whether the monetary exchange rate
model performs better in forecasting bilateral nominal exchange rates if the
underlying parameter estimates are obtained from panel estimations as com-
pared to country-by-country estimations. They ﬁnd the pooled estimator to
deliver a better forecasting performance, although the underlying poolability
hypothesis is statistically rejected. With regard to the empirical modeling of
real equilibrium exchange rates, Égert (2004) notes that
’Across diﬀerent papers, the whole gamut of fundamentals is
used, and, as a corollary, the outcome is sensitive to which partic-
ular fundamentals are included in the estimated model. The use
of diﬀerent fundamentals may be a result of diﬀerent theoretical
frameworks or may simply reﬂect ad hoc choices.’
So, whereas the choice of fundamentals is predetermined by the choice of the
monetary exchange rate model in Rapach and Wohar (2004), there is at least
some degree of arbitrariness with respect to the selection of determinants in
the class of models we consider.5 Notwithstanding the arbitrariness observed
in the relevant literature, it may well be that the importance of certain
determinants in explaining real eﬀective exchange rate movements diﬀers
across countries.6
To assess the reliability of time series versus panel approaches in estimat-
ing equilibrium exchange rates we therefore estimate up to 21 speciﬁcations
5Commonly chosen determinants include net foreign assets, measures of relative pro-
ductivity diﬀerentials, relative terms of trade, measures of the openness of a country, the
relative stock of government debt and real interest rate diﬀerentials. Less frequently, also
the real oil price (especially for emerging market countries) has been considered (Amano
and van Norden, 1998).
6However, it may be questionable whether one should call these country-speciﬁc deter-
minants ’fundamental’ determinants of real exchange rates.
2for each of the included countries (depending on the univariate time prop-
erties of the considered determinants) and twelve panel speciﬁcations over a
restricted sample from 1986Q1 to 2002Q4, and then compare the relative ac-
curacy of conditional forecasts obtained from these models over a hold-back
period from 2003Q1 to 2006Q4.7
We focus on two ’extreme’ estimators: the fully country-speciﬁc (i.e. het-
erogeneous) dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator and the pooled DOLS esti-
mator.8 Because we impose homogeneity of the cointegration slopes in the
pooled estimations, we formally check whether this restriction holds.9 How-
ever, even a rejection of the poolability null would not necessarily mean that
the obtained pooled estimates are worthless. It may well be that the ’beneﬁts
of higher estimation precision’ outweigh the ’costs of bias’ as also the results
from Rapach and Wohar (2004) suggest.10
While we follow the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) ap-
proach by Clark and MacDonald (1998) to estimate ’fundamentally justi-
ﬁed’ values of speciﬁc currencies, a number of other concepts with similar
acronyms have been proposed – most notably, the Fundamental Equilibrium
Exchange Rate (FEER) approach by Williamson (1994a) and the Natural
Real Exchange Rate (NATREX) approach by Stein (1995). Whereas the
latter two concepts are normative and involve ad-hoc judgments on the size
of central parameters, the BEER approach (which will be introduced in the
next section) is rather statistical and free of normative elements. Due to
the high number of publications dealing with equilibrium exchange rates and
the vast number of competing concepts, a literature survey on equilibrium
exchange rate would necessarily have to be very selective. Instead we refer to
the excellent survey articles by MacDonald (2000), Driver and Wren-Lewis
(1998), Driver and Westaway (2005), Williamson (1994b, and 2009).
This paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we shortly introduce
the BEER concept. In section 3 we present the data, its sources and how
the data has been transformed. In section 4 we give a short overview of
7Methodologically similar, Baltagi et al. (1997 and 2000) compare the out-of-sample
predictive performance of homogeneous versus various heterogeneous estimators for the
demand for gasoline respectively cigarettes.
8The DOLS estimator accounts for potentially endogenous regressors as opposed to
the simple OLS estimator. Disregarded endogeneities would be another potential source
of bias (simultaneity bias) we avoid by using DOLS.
9To check the robustness of the results, we alternatively use the modiﬁed OLS (FMOLS)
estimator as well as the respective group mean estimators, where the slope homogeneity
restrictions are not imposed.
10As a ’safety net’ we additionally apply the group-mean DOLS estimator by Pedroni
(2004), which gives consistent estimates of the average cointegration slopes, regardless
whether the long-run parameters are homogeneous or heterogeneous across countries.
3ﬁrst and second generation panel unit root tests, which will then be applied
– together with simple univariate unit root tests for each of the countries
individually – to examine the order of integration of the involved time series.
After a short methodological introduction, we will conduct the country-by-
country estimations in section 5. We then turn to the panel analysis. In
section 6 we present two kinds of panel cointegration tests, which will then
be applied to test for long-run relationships among various subsets of the
variables. In section 7 we conduct conditional forecasts over the hold-back-
period to assess the relative forecast accuracy of both models, which may be
regarded as an informal out-of-sample stability analysis. Based on the results
of this exercise, we choose a preferred speciﬁcation, which is then reestimated
over the full sample to derive equilibrium real eﬀective exchange rates and
currency misalignments. Finally, section 8 concludes the article.
2 The BEER Concept and the Choice of Fun-
damentals
In this section we present the origins of the BEER concept and shortly present
its theoretical foundations. For extensive surveys on the BEER concept and
related concepts (such as CHEER, FEER, ITMEER, NATREX) we refer to
Driver and Westaway (2005) and MacDonald (2000). The BEER concept
arised from the discomfort with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) as a reason-
able explanation for the observed real exchange rate behavior. Shocks to the
real exchange rate have been found to be too persistent to be accordant with
PPP (the so called ’PPP-puzzle’ (Rogoﬀ 1996)), ’typical’ half-life estimates
to shocks to PPP being around four years. The very slow mean reversion
speeds therefore provide at best support for an ’ultra-long-run’ concept of
equilibrium exchange rates (Edwards and Savastano, 1999). Often even no
signiﬁcant mean reversion has been found.11 From a theoretical point of view
PPP has been criticized as a concept for the determination of the equilib-
rium exchange rate, because it ignores the role of capital ﬂows and any real
determinants of the real exchange rate (MacDonald, 2000). The aim of the
BEER approach is on the one hand to be better able to relate the observed
exchange rate behavior to movements in certain other variables, and on the
other hand to correct the theoretical shortcomings of PPP as a method for
determining equilibrium exchange rates. A general problem with respect to
equilibrium exchange rates is that they are unobservable. Consequently, es-
timated long-run relationships between the observed real exchange rate and
11Surveys can be found in MacDonald (2000), and Taylor and Taylor (2004).
4the fundamentals are assumed to equal the equilibrium exchange rate towards
which the real exchange rate adjusts (Égert, 2004).12
The BEER approach is derived from the real interest parity condition
(thereby accounting for capital ﬂows) and – assuming that the expected
future real exchange rate is a function of fundamental variables – also takes
into account real determinants.
Following, we brieﬂy present the theoretical concept based on MacDonald
(2000):
Starting point is the risk-adjusted real UIP condition (which is completely
disregarded in the concept of PPP):
∆q
e
t+k = −(rt − r
∗
t) + λt (1)
where qt denotes the real exchange rate, e the expectations operator, rt the
ex-ante real interest rate and λt a risk premium. The real exchange rate is
expressed in foreign currency units per unit of domestic currency, so that an
increase represents a (real) appreciation of the domestic currency.
Rearranged for the real exchange rate we have:
qt = q
e





As the expected real exchange rate is unobservable, this relationship is
hard to test empirically; qe
t+k is therefore interpreted as the fundamental or
long-run component of the real exchange rate, denoted qt. Substituting into
(2) yields:
qt = qt + (rt − r
∗
t) − λt (3)
In a popular stock-ﬂow consistent model of exchange rate determination,
Faruqee (1995) identiﬁes the stock of net foreign assets and a set of exogenous
variables as fundamental determinants of the equilibrium (or long-run) ex-
change rate. In an extension of this model, Alberola et al. (1999) decompose
the real exchange rate into an external and an internal real exchange rate,
both of which relate to one speciﬁc theory of exchange rate determination.
The external rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the price of domestic relative to
foreign tradable goods and is connected to the notion of external balance,
whereas the internal rate is deﬁned as the relative price of non-tradable goods
to tradable goods within each country and connected to the notion of inter-
nal balance. The equilibrium exchange rate is the one at which external
12Funke (2005) describes the BEER as the ’data-determined systematic component of
the exchange rate in the medium and long run’.
5and internal balance are achieved, i.e. the tradable goods market is cleared
(and the desired net foreign asset position achieved), and there is no excess
demand for non-tradable goods.13
A short intuitive motivation for the inclusion of speciﬁc fundamentals,
which are hypothesized to account for the time-varying value of the real
exchange rate, and which are theoretically founded by one model or another
or are commonly used in the literature in an ad-hoc style is given below.
For model-speciﬁc derivations we refer to Frenkel and Mussa (1985), Faruqee
(1995), Chinn and Johnston (1996), and Alberola et al. (1999).
Net Foreign Assets
The eﬀect of a country’s net foreign asset position on the equilibrium
exchange rate is expected to be positive. According to standard in-
tertemporal macroeconomic models, a higher stock of net foreign lia-
bilities causes interest payments to increase, which ultimately have to
be paid for by improved trade balances. In order to generate higher net
exports, the competitiveness of the respective country has to improve,
necessitating a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
Productivity Bias
According to the well-known Balassa-Samuelson (BS) hypothesis, rel-
atively larger increases in productivity in the tradable goods sector
compared to the non-tradable goods sector are connected with a real
appreciation of the domestic currency. The rise in relative productivity
of the tradable goods sector causes wages in the tradable goods sector
to increase. Wage equalization across the sectors ensures that wages
in the non-tradable sector also increase (which is not compensated for
by an accordant rise in productivity). Consequently, the overall price
level is higher and we observe a real appreciation of the equilibrium
exchange rate.
Government Consumption
According to Genberg (1978), Bergstrand (1991), and MacDonald (1998)
the presence of non-traded goods can furthermore introduce a demand
side bias, if the income elasticity of demand for non-traded goods is
13The BEER approach therefore includes the same set of fundamentals as the FEER
approach. However, the latter implies the calibration of a sustainable current account and
therefore follows a normative approach.
6greater than 1. As government consumption is primarily devoted to
non-traded goods (compared to private consumption), a rise in govern-
ment consumption (or a redistribution of income towards the govern-
ment) therefore increases the relative price of non-tradable goods and
causes the equilibrium exchange rate to appreciate.14 On the other
hand, a growing budget deﬁcit might also cast doubt on the sustain-
ability of ﬁscal policy, destabilize the economy and lead to a real de-
preciation (Melecký and Komárek, 2007).
Terms of Trade
When traded goods are imperfect substitutes, their relative price might
change due to changes in supply and demand caused by changes in un-
derlying determinants such as consumer preferences or diﬀering growth
rates (Edwards, 1989 and Nilsson, 2004). Import and export price in-
dices will be aﬀected diﬀerently across countries, thereby changing the
relative terms of trade. The eﬀect of terms of trade shocks to the real
exchange rate is however ambiguous (Melecký and Komárek, 2007). On
the one hand, an increase in the (relative) prices of a country’s export
goods gives rise to a positive substitution eﬀect, because domestic pro-
ducers shift their production towards tradable goods. This will cause
wages in this sector to increase relative to the ones in the non-tradable
goods sector. If wages subsequently equalize across the sectors, this
will drive up the overall price level and thereby lead to a real appreci-
ation. However, at the same time a positive wealth eﬀect (reﬂected in
the improved current account) may generate higher demand for non-
tradable goods and necessitate a real depreciation to restore internal
balance (Melecký and Komárek, 2007).
Openness
Openness is often introduced as a proxy for trade liberalization. A
higher degree of openness (i.e. a removal of trade restrictions) may
lower domestic prices and cause a real depreciation (Goldfajn and
Valdes, 1999 and Elbadawi, 1994). As emphasized by Dufrenot and
Yehoue (2005) this variable is however more likely to be relevant for de-
veloping or emerging countries than for industrial ones, since we would
not expect the degree of openness to vary a lot for these countries. We
14See Chinn (1997) for a formal implementation of this argument in a real exchange rate
model.
7therefore think that its inﬂuence should, with the exception of China,
be fairly limited in our set of countries.
3 Data Description
Our panel consists of the US and 16 of its major trading partners: Australia,
Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. These coun-
tries either make up a a signiﬁcant part of US trade, or are an issuer of
a major currency, i.e. their currency circulates widely outside the country
of issue. Some countries have not been included in the panel due to too
much missing data for some of the relevant variables (Taiwan, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Brazil). The sample consists of quarterly data
from 1986Q1 to 2006Q4. For some variables and countries, data interpola-
tion techniques are applied to obtain quarterly data. All variables except
for the net foreign asset to GDP ratio, the trade balance to GDP ratio and
the openness ratio are measured relative to the trade-weighted average of
the respective variables of the trading partner countries. Trading weights are
constant throughout the sample and are taken from Bayoumi et al. (2005).15
The trade-weights for all included countries (rescaled so that they sum to 1)
are presented in table 9. Although the countries have been chosen with spe-
cial regard to the US, table 1 shows that all countries included in the panel
make up a large proportion of trade for each of the other countries (ranging
from 69 percent for Sweden to 90 percent for Mexico). So we believe that
the results are meaningful for all countries.
Table 1: Sum of Trade Weights of Partner Countries
AUS BEL CAN CHN FRA GER IRL ITA JPN
78% 89% 75% 78% 70% 84% 74% 70% 72%
KOR MEX NLD ESP SWE CHE UK US
74% 90% 77% 77% 69% 80% 77% 76%
Data is taken from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) unless stated
diﬀerently. Exchange rates are deﬁned in indirect quotation so that an in-
crease in the exchange rate implies an appreciation of the domestic currency.
Annual Consumer Price Inﬂation (CPI) for China has been obtained from the
15Reference period for the calculation of these weights is 2002/2003 and weights take
into account direct bilateral competition as well as third-market competition.
8National Bureau of Statistics of China, interpolated to quarterly frequency
and updated with growth rates from IFS.16 The real eﬀective exchange rate
(reer) is calculated as the geometric average of the 16 bilateral nominal ex-
change rate indices multiplied with the respective CPI ratio. Data on net
foreign assets is taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and updated by
accumulating current account balances. To scale the variables, we divide
by GDP to obtain the net foreign asset to GDP ratio (nfa). Alternatively,
we also use the trade balance to GDP ratio (tb), which is available at a
higher frequency.17 For China and Ireland annual GDP data is converted to
quarterly frequency for some periods.18 Relative terms of trade (tot) are de-
ﬁned as the ratio of the domestic export unit value and the domestic import
unit value divided by the geometrically weighted (using the same weights as
above) foreign ratios. The relative productivity diﬀerential (ntt) is proxied
by the ratio of the domestic consumer price index (CPI) to the domestic
wholesale price index (WPI) divided by the geometrically weighted foreign
ratios (see Faruqee, 1995, Gagnon, 1996, Alberola, 1999), and Bénassy-Quéré
at al. (2009).19
The real interest rate is calculated as the diﬀerence between the nominal
long-term interest rate and the percentage change of the CPI index compared
to its value in the same quarter in the year before. Nominal long-term interest
rates are partly taken from sourceOECD. For China the lending rate is used
instead, and for Mexico the 3-month treasury bill rate is taken until 1989Q4.20
The real interest rate diﬀerential (rird) is then calculated as the diﬀerence
between the domestic real interest rate and the trade-weighted arithmetic
average real interest rate of the trading partners. Relative government con-
sumption textbf(gov) is deﬁned as the domestic government consumption to
GDP-ratio relative to the trade-weighted ratios of government consumption
to GDP-ratios of the trading partners. Openness (open) is deﬁned as the
ratio of the sum of exports and imports (in absolute values) to GDP. While
reer, gov and tot are expressed in logarithmic terms, nfa, tb, open and rird
are measured as fractions of 100.
16We use the cubic-spline interpolation technique. However, results are robust to chang-
ing the interpolation technique.
17tb has ﬁrst been introduced as an alternative for nfa by MacDonald and Dias (2007). A
positive long-run relationship between nfa and reer implies a negative long-run relationship
between tb and reer.
18For Ireland until 1996Q4, for China until 1998Q4.
19This proxy is surely not undisputed (see for instance Schnatz and Osbat (2003). How-
ever, ﬁrst, it is in contrast to other (similarly disputable) indicators widely available, and
second, results by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009) indicate that results are largely robust.
20One missing value for Mexico for 1986Q3 is proxied by the average of the preceding
and the succeeding quarter.
94 (Panel) Unit Root Tests
As noted in the introduction we put ourselves once fully in the position of a
time series econometrician, and once in the position of a panel econometri-
cian. We also follow this approach when assessing the order of integration of
the involved time series.
Time series econometricians usually apply the familiar Dickey-Fuller type
univariate unit root tests to assess the order of integration of certain time se-
ries. Because the tests are fairly standard we do not introduce them here. We
conduct two types of tests, the well-known augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)
test as well as the Dickey-Fuller generalized least squares (DFGLS) test pro-
posed by Elliott et al. (1996).21 To save space, neithter the test results are
reported here, but can be obtained from the author upon request. Later,
we will conduct country-by-country tests for cointegration for all diﬀerent
subsets of variables, in which only variables are included that are tested to
be I(1) in the country-by-country unit root tests.
Univariate unit root tests are known to have low power to reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root, if the respective time series contains a ’near
unit root’, i.e. the autoregressive parameter is close to but lower than one.
Increasing the dimension of the panel from N = 1 (where N is the number
of cross section units) to N > 1 lowers the probability of committing a type
2 error. However, a number of complications arise in the presence of more
than one cross section unit. This is reﬂected in the large number of panel
unit root tests which have been developed. Whereas the rejection of the null
hypothesis of a unit root is trivial to interpret if N = 1, it is less obvious for
N > 1. Rejection could either mean that the respective series is stationary
for all cross units of the panel, or that it is stationary for a fraction of the
cross units included in the panel only.
We implement three panel unit root tests: The Levin-Lin-Chu (2002)
(LLC) test, the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) (IPS) test, and the Pesaran (2007)
CIPS (cross-sectionally augmented IPS) test. We will only comment on the
main diﬀerences among these three panel unit root tests. For a comprehensive
formal treatment of these and other panel unit root tests (including the
derivation of the tests and test statistics, and some Monte Carlo evidence)
see Breitung and Pesaran (2005), which we also draw upon in this short
survey. For an overview of second generation panel unit root tests see Hurlin
and Mignon (2007).
The tests we consider diﬀer in two main aspects: ﬁrst, whether a common
21Elliot et al. (1996) and Ng and Perron (2001) show that this test is more powerful
when an unknown trend and/or mean is present.
10autoregressive process is assumed under the alternative hypothesis, and sec-
ondly, how potential cross-sectional dependencies are dealt with. The LLC
and the IPS test belong to the so-called ’ﬁrst generation’ of panel unit root
tests, while the Pesaran CIPS test is one of several recently proposed ’sec-
ond generation’ tests. While the latter test takes into account cross-sectional
dependencies, the former two do not (or only to a very limited extent by
including common time dummies in the test regressions). While the LLC
and IPS tests are still the most commonly applied ones, several studies have
shown that the empirical size of a panel unit root test can vastly diverge
from the nominal size if cross-sectional dependencies are disregarded (see for
instance Banerjee et al., 2005).
Before we more carefully address the issue of cross-sectional dependencies,
we have a closer look at the LLC and IPS tests. The LLC test starts from
the following pooled ADF test regression (lags of the diﬀerenced dependent
variable are disregarded for simplicity):
∆yi,t = αi + δit + θt + ρiyi,t−1 + εi,t, (4)
The test allows for some degree of heterogeneity by including country ﬁxed
eﬀects (αi), country-speciﬁc deterministic (time) trends (δit) and dampens
the eﬀects of cross-sectional dependencies by including common time dum-
mies (θt). However, ρi is obtained by running a pooled OLS regression, i.e.
ρi = ρ for all countries. The null and alternative hypotheses of the LLC test
are H0 : ρi = 0∀i, respectively Ha : ρi = ρ < 0∀i. We see that the LLC test is
very restrictive under the alternative hypothesis by assuming that the series
follows the same autoregressive process for all cross units. This ’drawback’
is addressed by the IPS test, which is a group-mean test. The alternative
hypothesis is that Ha : ρi < 0 for at least one i. In contrast to the LLC
test, where the estimate of ρ is obtained by running a pooled regression, ρi is
estimated for each cross unit individually before a group-mean test statistic,
¯ t, is obtained though averaging the individual t-statistics. The test is less
restrictive because ρi may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent i under HA. Both tests
considered so far can only handle cross-sectional dependencies to a very lim-
ited degree (by including common time dummies). However, this approach
is not suitable if the pair-wise cross-section covariances of the error terms are
diﬀerent across the individual series (Pesaran, 2007). Pesaran (2007) there-
fore proposes a generalized IPS test, which allows a common factor to have
diﬀerent eﬀects on each cross unit.22
22Banerjee et al. (2005) show that the empirical size of panel unit root tests is much
higher than the nominal level in case there are cross-unit cointegration relationships which
are not taken into account in the respective critical values. In other words, it is likely that
11It is based on the following cross-sectionally augmented ADF (CADF)
test regression(s)
∆yi,t = αi + δit + ρiyi,t−1 + γi¯ yt−1 + ςi∆¯ yt + εi,t, (5)
where ∆yt and the lagged cross-sectional averages of yt serve as proxies for
the eﬀects of an unobserved common factor (Pesaran, 2006 and 2007). After
having run the CADF regressions for each of the cross units individually, a
group-mean statistic is again calculated (analogously to the IPS test), which
can then be compared to the respective critical value.
According to the results from the (pooled) LLC test and the (group-mean)
IPS test presented in table 2, all but two variables are integrated of order
one.23 Only tot and rird are tested to be stationary processes (at least for a
non-zero fraction of the countries included in the panel) at the 5% level.
To determine the (approximately) appropriate lag order for the CADF
regressions underlying the CIPS test we run auxiliary ADF test regressions
for each of the cross-section units prior to the estimation of the CADF test
regressions. We choose the lag order that minimizes the Hannan-Quinn cri-
terion (HQC) allowing for a maximum lag length of 8. Afterwards we apply
the CIPS test based on CADF-regressions with the respective previously
determined lag-lengths.
Table 3 shows the CIPS test results together with the selected average
lag lengths. The results show that our prior classiﬁcation regarding the order
of integration of the involved series still holds once we account for potential
cross-sectional dependencies. This result together with the uniform results
obtained from the LLC and IPS test suggest that our classiﬁcation into I(0)
and I(1) variables is robust.
Summarizing, all series apart from tot and rird are I(1) based on panel
unit root tests. As reer has also been tested to be I(1), the potential explana-
tory variables need to be I(1) as well in order to avoid unbalanced equations.
the true null of non-stationarity is rejected too often (i.e. the probability of a type 1 error
is higher) in the presence of cross-unit cointegration relationships. As an example, they
show that evidence based on panel unit root tests in favor of relative PPP collapses once
cross-section cointegration is taken into account by using suitable critical values.
23For the series in levels we include individual intercepts and individual trends, whereas
we include only country-speciﬁc intercepts for the series in ﬁrst diﬀerences. We ﬁrst started
with all 17 countries included in the panel. Results for the order of integration of reer were
borderline however. Country-speciﬁc individual unit root test results revealed that the reer
of Mexico and Switzerland seem to be (trend)stationary. We excluded these countries from
the subsequent analysis because of the supposedly diﬀerent order of integration of reer.
Applying the panel unit root tests to the smaller panel of 15 countries we obtain the
above-described clear results.
12Table 2: First Generation Panel Unit Root Test Results
REER NFA NTT TB
LLC level −0.67 −0.08 −0.33 1.87
1st diﬀ. −21.30∗∗∗ −2.48∗∗∗ −19.88∗∗∗ −30.87∗∗∗
IPS level −1.20 0.05 1.57 −1.21
1st diﬀ. −20.76∗∗∗ −12.62∗∗∗ −19.43∗∗∗ −32.84∗∗∗
TOT GOV OPEN RIRD
LLC level −1.86∗∗ 0.84 2.79 −2.18∗∗
1st diﬀ. −30.33∗∗∗ −33.28∗∗∗ −21.22∗∗∗ −21.94∗∗∗
IPS level −4.10∗∗∗ 1.50 1.65 −3.20∗∗∗
1st diﬀ. −29.52∗∗∗ −32.76∗∗∗ −23.06∗∗∗ −26.69∗∗∗
Note: Reported are the ¯ t-statistics for the IPS test and the t∗-statistics for
the LLC test. We allow for individual deterministic trends and constants,
and series are demeaned. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5,
and 10% level, respectively.
Table 3: CIPS Second Generation Panel Unit Root Test Results
REER NFA NTT TB
CIPS level −2.58 −2.37 −2.29 −2.36
avg. lags 1.53 3.13 1.00 1.00
CIPS 1st diﬀ. −5.92∗∗∗ −3.23∗∗∗ −5.80∗∗∗ −5.877∗∗∗
avg. lags 0.47 2.13 0.33 0.60
TOT GOV OPEN RIRD
CIPS level −2.99∗∗∗ −2.03 −1.70 −2.78∗∗
avg. lags 0.80 0.47 0.73 1.87
CIPS 1st diﬀ. −6.11∗∗∗ −5.94∗∗∗ −5.66 −5.62∗∗∗
avg. lags 0.60 0.27 0.73 1.87
Note: We report the ¯ t-statistics. Avg. lags denotes the average lag length
of the underlying CADF test regressions. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance
at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
13This implies that we will test for long-run relationships among subsets of
reer, nfa, tb, ntt, gov and open only, and disregard tot and rird in the panel
cointegration analysis. We however do not generally disregard these variables
in the country-by-country cointegration analyzes. Based on the country-by-
country univariate unit root tests tot appears to be non-stationary for some
of the countries. This result contrasts with the IPS and CIPS-test results,
which maintain that tot is not stationary for any of the cross units. It may
be regarded as a typical example for the previously noted lower power of
individual unit root tests compared to panel unit root tests in rejecting a
near unit root. However, as we consider the situation of a time series analyst
who only takes into account information based on regressions for a single
cross unit, this knowledge would not be available to him. In line with the
previous argument, the fraction of nonstationary series is larger according to
the country-by-country unit root tests. Consequently, the number of speciﬁ-
cations which need to be tested for cointegration is also larger compared to
the panel analysis.
5 Country-by-Country Analysis
5.1 Tests for Cointegration and Estimation Methodol-
ogy
We (primarily) apply the DOLS estimator to estimate the long-run relation-
ships among subsets of variables. We choose this speciﬁc estimator for two
reasons: First, it can easily be applied in (nonstationary) panel regressions
as well. By choosing the equivalent panel estimator we narrow down the rea-
sons for possibly diﬀerent results, because diﬀerent estimation results cannot
be attributed to a diﬀerent estimation technique then. Secondly, the DOLS
estimator accounts for potential endogeneities among the variables.24
DOLS has been introduced by Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson
(1993) and extended to panel analysis by Kao and Chiang (1997). By incor-
porating leads and lags of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the regressors endogenous
feedback eﬀects from the dependent variable to the regressors are absorbed.
In contrast to OLS, the DOLS estimator is therefore consistent, even if regres-
sors are endogenous. Without a cross-sectional dimension, a DOLS(k1,k2)
regression can be written as:
24The regular OLS estimator is biased if regressors are not weakly exogenous.









where k1 and k2 denote the numbers of leads and lags, which can be chosen
according to various information criteria.
To check which of the estimated regressions are spurious and which form
long-run relationships, we perform Engle-Granger cointegration tests. Criti-
cal values for the Engle-Granger cointegration tests are calculated from the
response surface function presented in MacKinnon (1990). Using these ob-
tained critical values we check whether the residuals from the supposed long-
run relationship, υt = Yt − β0 −
n P
i=1
βiXi,t, are indeed stationary. If not,
then the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected and the relationship is
spurious.
In order to check whether the results are robust against using another es-
timation technique, we additionally present results obtained from fully mod-
iﬁed OLS (FMOLS) regressions. The FMOLS estimator also accounts for
endogenous regressors, but in contrast to the DOLS estimator, the bias cor-
rection is obtained in a non-parametric way.
5.2 Estimation Results
So far we have neither presented country-by-country unit root test nor coin-
tegration test results, since this would consume too much space due to the
large number of series/speciﬁcations. Instead, we directly report the DOLS
and FMOLS estimation results in table 2.11 for the speciﬁcations for which
the following three conditions are fulﬁlled: First, all series included in each of
the speciﬁcations have to be I(1) according to the individual countries’ unit
root test results, secondly, the residual of the cointegration vector has to be
stationary, and thirdly, there has to be mean reversion in the error correction
model (ECM) representation so that the regression can be interpreted as a
real exchange rate equation. Consequently, for the large number of remaining
speciﬁcations which are not reported here, at least one of the three conditions
is not fulﬁlled. Only DOLS(1,1) results are reported, because the inclusion
of further leads and lags changed the point estimates only marginally. The
reported standard errors of the DOLS regressions are heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC).
Overall, the results are very mixed. First, for four countries (AUS, ESP,
FRA, and UK) we do not ﬁnd any speciﬁcation fulﬁlling all the above cri-
teria. Secondly, we do not ﬁnd a single speciﬁcation (containing the same
15set of explanatory variables) for the remaining countries, either pointing to-
wards true heterogeneity of the diﬀerent BEER equations or to imprecise
estimates due to the relatively low number of observations for each of the
cross-section units. Stationary combinations including nfa are only obtained
for four countries (CHN, JPN, IRE, and NLD) and the estimated signs are
counterintuitive.25 Also tb is only included and signiﬁcant in a very few cases
(CAN, CHN, and US).26 Based on the country-speciﬁc estimation results we
could therefore doubt their economic signiﬁcance. However, we abstain from
drawing further conclusions at this point, and will instead reconsider the role
of nfa and tb in the context of the subsequent panel analysis.
Whereas evidence in favor of these commonly hypothesized determinants
is at best weak, we ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of the BS eﬀect. It is
included in all speciﬁcations and the sign and size of the coeﬃcient estimates
are plausible (a one percent increase in ntt is connected with a 0.65 percent
to 2.67 percent appreciation of the domestic currency).
Evidence for the other determinants is mixed again. tot is included in
only three speciﬁcations (CAN, CHN, and SWE), which is not surprising
against the background of the panel unit root tests, according to which tot is
stationary, whereas reer is nonstationary. For the above three speciﬁcations
the estimated coeﬃcient of tot is always positive thereby providing weak
evidence in favor of the substitution eﬀect dominating the wealth eﬀect.
While open is included in the speciﬁcations of six countries (CAN, GER,
JPN, KOR, NLD, and SWE) the respective point estimates vastly diﬀer
(estimated coeﬃcients range from -0.35 for CHN to about -6.43 for JPN).
gov has a signiﬁcantly negative impact on reer in three countries (CAN,
CHN, and IRL). This lends some support to the hypothesis that concerns
about ﬁscal sustainability dominate the eﬀects of (relatively) higher govern-
ment spending on non-traded goods in these countries. In the case of JPN,
the relationship among gov and reer is signiﬁcantly positive.
The FMOLS results are in most cases very similar to the DOLS(1,1)
results. Consequently, our results do not seem to depend on the choice of
the estimator.
In the last column of table 2.11 (labeled α), we report the estimated
adjustment coeﬃcient in each respective ECM. Based on these values we cal-
culate the implied half-life time of deviations from the estimated equilibrium
exchange rate for each of the speciﬁcations according to t1/2 =
ln(0.5)
ln(1+α), where
α is the respective adjustment parameter in the ECM.
25For JPN there is a smaller speciﬁcation excluding nfa which is also stationary. So nfa
does not seem to be necessary to ’achieve’ stationarity.
26The signiﬁcance depends on whether results are obtained by DOLS or FMOLS.
16The half-life time varies between less than 2 quarters and about 5 quar-
ters for most of the speciﬁcations, which is a dramatic improvement over
previously estimated half-life times implied by PPP, and an even larger ’im-
provement’ compared to our own ﬁnding that reer is I(1) implying that there
is no signiﬁcant mean reversion (and therefore no evidence supporting PPP)
at all.27 Notwithstanding the favorable results in terms of adjustment speeds
towards equilibrium, the obtained country-by-country results are very mixed
in general, and one should therefore not overemphasize these ﬁndings, be-
cause they may be based on imprecise estimates.
Summarizing the country-by-country results, it is highly diﬃcult to ﬁnd
sensible and robust speciﬁcations for the regarded countries. This may either
be attributed to the low power of cointegration tests in small samples (68
observations), and, closely related, to imprecise estimates, or, trivially, to
the non-existence of sensible cointegration relationships among the variables.
However, there is one exception: We obtain sensible results with respect to
ntt, which is estimated quite robustly across units with the expected positive
sign and by and large reasonable coeﬃcient estimates. This lends strong
support to the BS-eﬀect.
6 Panel Analysis
6.1 Tests for Panel Cointegration and Estimation Method-
ology
There is a close analogy between panel cointegration tests and panel unit root
tests. Some of the tests are based on group-mean estimates, others on pooled
estimates. Some take into account cross-sectional dependencies, while others
do not. We will apply two representative (bundles of) panel cointegration
tests: the very popular Pedroni (2004) test(s) for panel cointegration and the
recently introduced test(s) by Westerlund (2007). A comprehensive survey
on panel cointegration tests is provided by Breitung (2005).
Since the Pedroni panel cointegration test (2004) is residual-based, it can
be regarded as a panel equivalent of the Engle-Granger test for cointegration
commonly applied in time series analysis. Pedroni proposes seven tests, of
which three are group-mean tests and the remaining four are pooled tests
(with the respective diﬀering alternative hypotheses). A detailed discussion
of each individual test statistic is outside the scope of this paper and we refer
to Pedroni’s (2004) original article for further details. Similarly as in the case
27Only in GER and ITA adjustment to shocks is much slower (the implied half-life time
is about 3 years for Germany and almost 6 years for Italy).
17of the Johansen test for cointegration, short-run parameters and country-
speciﬁc deterministic trends are ﬁltered out in two ﬁrst stage regressions.
By doing so the Pedroni test allows for country-speciﬁc short-run eﬀects
and diﬀerent lag-lengths in the test-regressions (in contrast to the formerly
heavily applied test by Kao, 1999). In general, it can be regarded as a
sign of robustness if several of the diﬀerent test statistics lead to the same
test decision, because evidence based on Monte Carlo simulations has shown
that the various test statistics perform diﬀerently depending on the panel
dimension and the assumed data generating process.
The error-correction based test by Westerlund (2007) does not only allow
for various forms of heterogeneity, but also provides p-values which are robust
against cross-sectional dependencies via bootstrapping.28 In short, it is tested
whether the null of no error correction can be rejected (either for the whole
panel or for a non-zero fraction of the cross units depending on whether a
pooled or group-mean estimation is performed). If the null can be rejected,
there is evidence in favor of cointegration.
While two of the four tests are panel tests with the alternative hypothesis
that the whole panel is cointegrated (HP
A : αi = α < 0 for all i), the other
two tests are group-mean tests which test against the alternative hypothesis
that for at least one cross-section unit there is evidence of cointegration
(HG
A : αi < 0 for at least one i). For the group-mean test statistics, the error
correction coeﬃcient is estimated for each cross-section unit individually, and
then two average statistics (denoted Gt, respectively Gα) are calculated.29 In
the pooled tests, the series of each cross-section unit are ’cleaned’ ﬁrst (of
dynamic nuisance parameters, unit-speciﬁc intercepts and/or trends), before
the conditional (or ’cleaned’) panel error correction model is estimated to
obtain a common α estimate, which is checked for signiﬁcance.
6.2 Estimation Results
While we apply the Pedroni test to search for long-run relationships among
twelve diﬀerent subsets of variables, the Westerlund test is only applied to
the speciﬁcations for which the Pedroni tests provide strong evidence in favor
of cointegration.30 The number of subsets is determined by the results of the
28For a description of the respective STATA procedure see Persyn and Westerlund
(2008).
29For more details on the test-statistics and their derivation see the above reference.
30Banerjee et al. (2004) show that panel cointegration tests can be largely oversized in
the presence of cross-unit long-run relationships. Not accounting for such relationships
therefore makes it more likely to obtain a ﬁnding in favor of cointegration, which may
be false. It is therefore sensible to apply the Westerlund test which accounts for cross-
18Table 4: Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test Results
Speciﬁcation M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
REER REER REER REER REER REER
NFA NFA NFA NFA
TB TB




ν-stat. 1.13 1.16 0.92 1.04 1.14 0.68
ρ-stat. 0.00 0.37 0.56 0.78 −0.79 0.03
t-stat. (ADF) −0.80 −0.59 −0.47 −0.42 −1.66 −1.05
t-stat. (PP) −1.35∗ −1.12 −0.83 −0.02 −2.32 −0.92
Group Mean Tests
ρ-statistic 1.26 1.43 1.63 1.75 0.59 1.45
t-stat. (PP) 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.16 −0.79 −0.06
t-stat. (ADF) −1.11 −0.96 −0.75 0.78 −2.34∗∗∗ −0.75
Speciﬁcation M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
REER REER REER REER REER REER
TB TB
NTT NTT NTT NTT NTT NTT
GOV GOV GOV
OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN
Panel Tests
ν-stat. 1.04 0.90 1.67∗∗ 1.05 1.12 0.86
ρ-stat. 0.15 0.65 −1.68∗∗ −0.63 −0.47 0.01
t-stat. (ADF) −0.80 −0.56 −2.18∗∗ −1.45∗ −1.12 −0.95
t-stat. (PP) −1.35∗ −0.97 −2.40∗∗∗ −1.65∗∗ −1.31∗ −0.87
Group Mean Tests
ρ-statistic 1.24 1.72 −0.08 0.61 0.73 1.14
t-stat. (PP) −0.14 0.08 −1.26 −0.69 −0.36 −0.19
t-stat. (ADF) −1.12 −1.17 −1.86∗∗ −1.57∗ −0.76 −0.62
Note: ***,** and * denote the signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5, and 10%.
19Table 5: Westerlund Panel Cointegration Test
Statistic Value Z-value p-value Robust
p-value
Gt -2.515 -3.180 0.001 0.010
Ga -9.452 -1.644 0.050 0.030
Pt -7.708 -2.114 0.017 0.098
Pa -7.580 -2.922 0.002 0.023
Note: Note: Optimal lag/lead length determined
by Akaike Information Criterion with a maximum
lag/lead length of 3. Width of Bartlett-kernel win-
dow set to 3. We allow for a constant, but no de-
terministic trend in the cointegration relationship.
Number of bootstraps to obtain bootstrapped p-
values which are robust against cross-sectional de-
pendencies set to 400.
panel unit root tests, according to which only reer, nfa, tb, ntt, and open are
I(1), and additionally by our own requirement that ntt is included in all tested
subsets. While this may seem somewhat arbitrary, we believe it is sensible
to do so against the background of the country-by-country estimation results
providing strong evidence of the BS-eﬀect.
One result is particularly remarkable: Evidence in favor of cointegration
is the strongest when only ntt is considered as a regressor (see table 4). In
this case, 5 of the reported 7 statistics point towards the presence of a coin-
tegrating relationship among the variables. If the speciﬁcation additionally
includes gov we can only reject the null of no cointegration in 3 of 7 cases. For
three other speciﬁcations only one of the statistics points towards cointegra-
tion, for the remaining 7 speciﬁcations we ﬁnd no evidence of cointegration
at all, although the former speciﬁcations are restricted versions of the latter.
The results imply that while the linear combination in M9 forms an irre-
ducible cointegration relationship, the others do not. In contrast, the linear
combinations seem ’less stationary’ once further variables are included. In
table 5 we present the Westerlund test results for M9. In the last column
we present the bootstrapped p-values, which account for cross-sectional de-
pendencies. They point towards reer and ntt being cointegrated, thereby
supporting the overall Pedroni test result. According to three of the four
test statistics we can reject the null of no signiﬁcant error correction at the
sectional dependencies only to the speciﬁcations for which the Pedroni test points towards
cointegration.
20Table 6: Pooled DOLS Estimates





NTT 1.15∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗






Note: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors in brackets. ***,** and * denote
the signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. The null hypothesis of
the Roy-Zellner test is poolability/slope homogeneity across countries.
5%-level, while one rejects only at the 10% level.31
As stated above, we also focus on the DOLS estimator in our panel anal-
ysis. First we run pooled DOLS regressions allowing for two-way ﬁxed eﬀects
(country ﬁxed eﬀects and common time eﬀects). The pooled is estimator
is only unbiased if the cointegration slopes are equal across countries. We
therefore formally test whether the poolability hypothesis is not rejected after
having performed the estimations.
We report Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which account for
within-group correlation, heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation.32
Because the inclusion of common time eﬀects does not substantially change
the point estimates of the other coeﬃcients, we only present the point esti-
mates without common time dummies included.
DOLS(1,1) results for the restricted sample are presented in table 6 for
the speciﬁcations, for which at least one of the reported Pedroni test statis-
tics is in favor of rejecting the null of no cointegration, however, given the
results of the panel cointegration tests we focus on speciﬁcations 9 and 10
in the subsequent analysis. The ﬁndings suggest that only ntt is necessary
31According to the asymptotic p-values in the second-last column, we can reject the null
of no cointegration in all cases.
32We used the STATA module ’xtscc’ by Hoechle (2007) to provide robust standard
errors.
21Table 7: Group Mean DOLS and FMOLS Estimates
M1 M9 M10
DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS
NFA −0.02 0.02
(−0.64) (−0.20)
NTT 1.43∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗
(13.07) (12.57) (16.38) (14.16) (18.73) (14.70)
GOV −0.30∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗
(−2.93) (−2.66)
Note: ***,** and * denote the signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
to achieve stationarity.33 The obtained point estimate of ntt is signiﬁcantly
positive and of reasonable size (with a point estimate of 1.18). A value larger
than the hypothesized value of 1 seems reasonable as our rough proxy is likely
to capture other demand side eﬀects as well. Accordingly, the panel results
support the results obtained in the country-by-country analysis with respect
to the relevance of ntt.
However, we have to be cautious in interpreting the results, because we
have to reject the null hypothesis of poolability across countries according to
the Roy-Zellner test (Roy, 1959, Zellner, 1962, and Baltagi, 2005), which is
reported for speciﬁcations 9 and 10 at the bottom of table 6.34
Baltagi (2005) and Baltagi and Griﬃn (1997) suggest to choose a prag-
matic approach. Instead of disregarding the pooled model if the poolability
restriction is rejected, they propose to base the decision of whether pool-
ing is advantageous or not on the out-of-sample forecast performance of the
heterogeneous models vs. the pooled model. We will follow their advice.
Before we do so in the subsequent section, we provide group-mean DOLS
and FM-OLS results of the cointegration slopes for three diﬀerent models
(M1, M9, and M10). Group-mean DOLS and FMOLS estimators have been
introduced by Pedroni (2004). The advantage of these estimators is that
they provide consistent estimates of the average cointegration slopes even
if the slopes are in fact diﬀerent across countries. We choose the above
33It contrast to all other combinations reer and ntt form a so-called irreducible cointe-
gration relationship (Davidson, 1999).
34We only test the slope coeﬃcients of the original regressors in levels (ntt, respectively
ntt, gov) for homogeneity across countries, not the ones from the lags and leads of their
ﬁrst diﬀerences. See Vaona (2008) on how to implement this test in STATA.
22models for two reasons: First, evidence of cointegration has been strongest
for M9 and M10. Secondly, because nfa has commonly been included in
BEER equations we want to check whether its numerically small coeﬃcient
estimate obtained in the pooled regression may be due to omitted variable
bias in M1.35 Estimation results are presented in table 7.
We observe that the estimate of the cointegration slope coeﬃcient of ntt
hardly changes in our preferred speciﬁcation M9 (from 1.18 in the pooled
DOLS regression to 1.24 and 1.21 in the group-mean FMOLS and DOLS
regressions, respectively). The same holds for M10, where the coeﬃcient
of gov either does not change much if we apply the group mean DOLS or
FMOLS estimator instead of the pooled estimator (-0.32 compared to -0.30).
It is furthermore notable that the coeﬃcient estimate of nfa is even smaller
and insigniﬁcant in the group mean regressions (see M1). Consequently,
the small coeﬃcient estimate of nfa in M1 in the pooled case may even be
too large. Based on these ﬁndings and the country-by-country estimation
results, nfa does not seem to be a fundamental determinant of reer.36 It is
therefore hard to argue that the depreciation of the USD in current years
is a direct response to the growing US external liabilities. However, this
surely does not mean that nfa does not have any inﬂuence on the reer at
all. If one is on the one hand willing to accept the theoretically appealing
proposition that net foreign liabilities ultimately have to be repaid and on
the other hand empirical evidence in favor of a linear long-run relationship is
at most weak, this may raise concerns of a (non-linear) sudden adjustment
once certain thresholds are reached. We leave such a threshold-analysis as
well as a robustness check of our results with respect to other countries and
samples to further research.
7 Conditional Forecasts
Based on the results of the panel cointegration tests, the plausibility of the
coeﬃcient estimates, and the limited impact of other variables on reer, panel
speciﬁcations M9 and M10 are the only panel speciﬁcations which we con-
sider in our conditional forecasting exercise over the reserved part of the
sample (2003Q1 to 2006Q4). Their forecasting performances are compared
35By pooling the data, we implicitly introduce this form of bias if the slope homogeneity
restriction does not hold.
36Panel results of Villavicencio (2006) with regard to the the coeﬃcient of nfa are very
similar. He considers two diﬀerent panel estimators (DOLS and the pooled mean group
estimator), but only according to one (PMGE) nfa enters signiﬁcantly into a long-run
relationship with reer. Additionally, the estimated coeﬃcients are also very small (around
0.06) and very similar to our estimates.
23with the ones from the fully country-speciﬁc time series models. To assess
the relative forecasting performance of the competing models, we conduct
conditional forecasts in the reserved part of the sample. The estimated coef-
ﬁcients are held ﬁxed at their in-sample values for the whole ex-post forecast
evaluation horizon. The interpretation of the results warrants some caution
however. Forecasting errors may either be attributed to the instability of the
estimated parameters or to true misalignments of the REER with respect
to its estimated equilibrium value. But we believe that the objective of the
BEER approach to match the observed real exchange rate behavior as closely
as possible, should also remain the objective out-of-sample. We therefore re-
gard a model as superior to another if it provides a better out-of-sample
ﬁt.37 To assess the relative predictive performance of two competing models
(within a speciﬁc sample) we calculate their relative root mean squared error
(RMSE). Table 8 shows the relative RMSE for diﬀerent pairs of models. In
this table we only consider the fully-country speciﬁc model delivering the best
ﬁt over the hold-back period and our preferred panel speciﬁcations M9 and
M10.
As the predictions based on both panel speciﬁcations are very similar,
we subsequently only comment on the more parsimonious speciﬁcation M9.
According to the relative RMSE, panel speciﬁcation M9 delivers a better
forecasting performance for 8 out of 11 countries, the only exceptions be-
ing BEL, CHN and JPN. To test whether the forecasting performance is
signiﬁcantly better, we conduct Diebold Mariano tests, which test the null
hypothesis of equal expected forecast accuracy against the alternative of dif-
ferent forecasting ability across models. As only conditional forecasts are
conducted, the classical Diebold Mariano statistic can be used and no cor-
rection for possible autocorrelation among the residuals has to be made since
there are no overlapping forecasts. The panel delivers signiﬁcantly better
forecasts for 8 countries (see table 9), the fully country-speciﬁc models are
signiﬁcantly better in just two cases (BEL and JPN). This results is remark-
able, since we have given the heterogeneous estimator an ’unfair’ advantage
by choosing the country-speciﬁc model with the best out-of-sample ﬁt prior
to comparing it to the performance of the two panel speciﬁcations.
Based on these results, we think that pooling the data provides more ro-
bust estimates of the impact of underlying fundamentals on the (observed)
real exchange rate, although the poolability hypothesis is statistically re-
jected. Given the better performance of the pooled estimator in terms of
RMSE performance, we recommend its use when calculating equilibrium ex-
37Considering the limited size of the reserved sample, we certainly cannot be sure,
whether this result is robust or simply due to the presence of extraordinary shocks.
24Table 8: Relative RMSE: Country-Best vs. Panel Speciﬁcations
BEL BEL10 M9 M10 JPN JPN20 M9 M10
BEL10 1.00 JPN20 1.00
M9 1.57 1.00 M9 1.14 1.00
M10 2.16 1.38 1.00 M10 0.82 0.72 1.00
CAN CAN12 M9 M10 KOR KOR18 M9 M10
CAN12 1.00 KOR18 1.00
M9 0.64 1.00 M9 0.47 1.00
M10 0.55 0.85 1.00 M10 0.16 0.79 1.00
CHN CHN8 M9 M10 NLD NLD4 M9 M10
CHN8 1.00 NLD4 1.00
M9 1.30 1.00 M9 0.54 1.00
M10 6.14 4.72 1.00 M10 0.65 1.20 1.00
GER GER20 M9 M10 SWE SWE17 M9 M10
GER20 1.00 SWE17 1.00
M9 0.15 1.00 M9 0.12 1.00
M10 0.12 0.80 1.00 M10 0.16 1.30 1.00
IRL IRL5 M9 M10 US US16 M9 M10
IRL5 1.00 US16 1.00
M9 0.60 1.00 M9 0.54 1.00
M10 0.40 0.67 1.00 M10 0.58 1.08 1.00
ITA ITA11 M9 M10
ITA11 1.00
M9 0.41 1.00
M10 0.66 1.61 1.00
Note: Only the fully country-speciﬁc model providing the lowest RMSE
of all respective country speciﬁcations is considered here. For all other
country-speciﬁc models listed in table 2.11 the relative RMSE performance
of the reported panel speciﬁcations consequently would be even better.
25Table 9: Diebold Mariano Tests
Intercept Intercept
Country-Best Country-Best












Note: ***,** and * denote rejection of the null
hypothesis of equal forecasting performance at
the signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5, and 10%. A neg-
ative sign implies a higher forecast accuracy of
the country-by-country model vs. the pooled
model.
26change rates. The eﬃciency gains achieved by the increased sample size and
regressor variability seem to outweigh the costs of inducing bias by imposing
identical coeﬃcients.38
8 Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate Misalignments
To derive currency misalignments, we ﬁrst re-estimate panel speciﬁcation M9
over the full sample. Results are similar compared to the ones obtained over
the restricted sample. This underscores the stability of the parameter esti-
mates derived from the panel.39 Figure 2.2 shows the estimated equilibrium
real eﬀective exchange rates (only based on the long-run relationship, lags
and leads of ﬁrst diﬀerences are not included) and the historical real eﬀective
exchange rates for all countries together with the implied percentage over-
valuation. Since the net foreign asset to GDP ratio is not included in our
ﬁnal speciﬁcation, it is hard to argue that the sharp depreciation of the USD
in current years is a direct response to the growing US external liabilities.
Based on our results in the preceding sections we would rather say that the
direct inﬂuence of the US net foreign asset position on the real value of the
USD is fairly limited.
extitnfa does not have any inﬂuence on the reer at all. If one is on the
one hand willing to accept the theoretically appealing proposition that net
foreign liabilities ultimately have to be repaid and on the other hand empirical
evidence in favor of a linear long-run relationship is at most weak, this may
raise concerns of a (non-linear) sudden adjustment once certain thresholds
are reached.
For ease of exposition ﬁgure 1 shows the US REER together with the
estimated equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) and the implied percentage
misalignment (right ﬁgure). We observe that the US reer follows the general
movements of the estimated equilibrium exchange rate. We ﬁnd the US
Dollar to be undervalued over a long period from 1987 to 1997 (reaching
about 10 percent in early 1993) and to be overvalued from 2000 to 2003
(with a peak overvaluation of about 13 percent in 2001). Since then we
observe a correction towards its estimated equilibrium value. At the end of
the sample we ﬁnd the USD to be very close to its predicted value. For
Germany we observe an approximate mirror image of this development. Its
equilibrium exchange rate is found to be overvalued between 1990 and 1997
38See Baltagi (2005). For further details about this method of choosing between pooling
or not and another application see Schiavo (2008).
39In contrast, re-estimating the fully country-speciﬁc models over the full sample some-
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Figure 1: US REER vs. BEER and Misalignment in %
and highly undervalued from 2000 to 2003. At the end of 2006 we see a
moderate overvaluation of about 3 percent.40 End of 2006 we ﬁnd a number
of currencies to be misaligned. The Canadian Dollar, the British Pound
and the Australian Dollar are 8, 8, respectively 14 percent overvalued in
real terms, whereas we see a strong undervaluation of about 22 percent of
the Japanese Yen. In contrast to the widespread view that the the Chinese
Renminbi is highly undervalued, we ﬁnd its real value to be in line with the
only remaining fundamental. However, this interpretation surely rests on the
assumption of appropriately measured Chinese price indices.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate equilibrium real eﬀective exchange rates and de-
rive currency misalignments for 15 countries. To account for the observed
arbitrariness when it comes to selecting possibly relevant fundamentals or
choosing a particular speciﬁcation, we estimate a large number of speciﬁca-
tions for each of the countries individually, and then conduct various pooled
estimations. Although the poolability hypothesis is statistically rejected, we
ﬁnd the pooled estimator to perform signiﬁcantly better in terms of condi-
tional out-of-sample forecasts for most of the countries. This is a remarkable
result, since we have given the heterogeneous (country-by-country) estimator
an unfair advantage by choosing the country-speciﬁc model (of up to 21 possi-
ble ones) with the best out-of-sample performance prior to comparing it with
40These results are very similar to the ones Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2008) obtain for the
’synthetic’ Euro. So the development of the Deutsche Mark seems to be a good proxy for
the Euro, although intra-Eurozone trade has not been netted out and therefore trading
weights have not been adjusted accordingly.
28two parsimonious panel speciﬁcations. Robustness of the pooled estimates is
further supported by very similiar group-mean point estimates. Furthermore,
panel unit root and panel cointegration test results do not change once we
allow for cross-sectional dependencies having diﬀerent eﬀects on each cross
unit. While we ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of the BS eﬀect, evidence in
favor of other commonly hypothesized fundamentals is only weak. End of
2006 we ﬁnd two currencies to be signiﬁcantly overvalued: the Australian
and the Canadian Dollar. On the other side, we ﬁnd the Japanese Yen to
be more than 20 percent undervalued. A possible extension to our analysis
would be to check the relative forecasting performance of pooled estimators
for sub-panels for which the null hypothesis of poolability cannot be rejected.
For our panel of 15 countries another 32751 sub-panels consisting of at least
two countries could be tested with the help of an iterative procedure. Since
there is no evidence for a linear relationship between net foreign assets and
long-run real eﬀective exchange rates according to our results, a careful in-
vestigation of possible non-linearities seems warranted.
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35Table 10: Trade Weights for Panel
AUS BEL CAN CHN FRA GER IRL ITA JPN KOR MEX NLD ESP SWE CHE UK US
AUS 0.000 0.022 0.029 0.090 0.044 0.089 0.013 0.047 0.180 0.053 0.011 0.023 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.079 0.269
BEL 0.008 0.000 0.014 0.028 0.164 0.206 0.019 0.088 0.047 0.012 0.008 0.077 0.048 0.023 0.022 0.117 0.121
CAN 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.032 0.020 0.033 0.005 0.016 0.051 0.015 0.031 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.026 0.732
CHN 0.017 0.015 0.031 0.000 0.041 0.087 0.006 0.035 0.258 0.085 0.016 0.020 0.016 0.012 0.010 0.037 0.313
FRA 0.007 0.064 0.016 0.033 0.000 0.218 0.021 0.120 0.053 0.015 0.009 0.050 0.094 0.020 0.034 0.104 0.142
GER 0.009 0.054 0.017 0.046 0.144 0.000 0.023 0.116 0.073 0.020 0.014 0.066 0.056 0.028 0.056 0.106 0.172
IRL 0.008 0.029 0.016 0.020 0.081 0.140 0.000 0.052 0.071 0.018 0.010 0.039 0.027 0.016 0.024 0.218 0.230
ITA 0.010 0.046 0.016 0.036 0.158 0.231 0.017 0.000 0.055 0.018 0.011 0.050 0.069 0.019 0.040 0.088 0.135
JPN 0.021 0.016 0.032 0.162 0.041 0.086 0.014 0.033 0.000 0.086 0.021 0.022 0.015 0.012 0.015 0.047 0.378
KOR 0.017 0.011 0.025 0.150 0.033 0.065 0.010 0.030 0.239 0.000 0.020 0.017 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.039 0.313
MEX 0.003 0.006 0.041 0.022 0.015 0.036 0.004 0.014 0.045 0.016 0.000 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.014 0.759
NLD 0.007 0.068 0.014 0.034 0.110 0.223 0.022 0.083 0.060 0.017 0.008 0.000 0.043 0.030 0.026 0.127 0.126
ESP 0.006 0.045 0.012 0.029 0.224 0.199 0.016 0.125 0.044 0.015 0.012 0.046 0.000 0.019 0.021 0.098 0.090
SWE 0.013 0.042 0.019 0.046 0.095 0.201 0.019 0.068 0.069 0.017 0.013 0.062 0.037 0.000 0.024 0.118 0.156
CHE 0.008 0.030 0.014 0.028 0.114 0.286 0.020 0.103 0.063 0.014 0.010 0.040 0.030 0.017 0.000 0.081 0.140
UK 0.013 0.051 0.022 0.033 0.116 0.178 0.061 0.074 0.066 0.020 0.009 0.063 0.046 0.028 0.027 0.000 0.194
US 0.014 0.017 0.196 0.088 0.049 0.090 0.020 0.036 0.168 0.050 0.154 0.020 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.060 0.000
Note: Original trade weights taken from Bayoumi et al. (2005), and rescaled so that weights sum to 1.
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6Table 11: Country-by-Country DOLS and FMOLS Estimates
NFA TB NTT GOV TOT OPEN ¯ R2 α
BEL10 DOLS 0.89 0.83∗∗∗ 0.35 0.75 −0.13
(0.61) (0.12) (0.34) (0.08)
FMOLS 0.67 0.83∗∗∗ 0.31 0.72
(0.47) (0.11) (0.25)
CAN10 DOLS −1.05∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.96 −0.24∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.13) (0.24) (0.14)
FMOLS −0.94∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.93
(0.45) (0.11) (0.16)
CAN12 DOLS −0.75 1.48∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.97 −0.33∗
(0.46) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22) (0.19)
FMOLS −0.70∗ 1.48∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.94
(0.40) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14)
CAN14 DOLS −0.34 1.01∗∗∗ −0.25∗ 0.74∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗ 0.97 −0.33∗∗
(0.42) (0.26) (0.14) (0.20) (0.16) (0.20)
FMOLS −0.45 0.94∗∗∗ −0.16 0.71∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ 0.95
(0.34) (0.18) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
CAN21 DOLS 1.05∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ 0.97 −0.24∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.12) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12)
FMOLS 1.00∗∗∗ −0.19∗ 0.68∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ 0.95
(0.18) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
continued on next page
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CHN2 DOLS −0.76∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ −0.67∗∗∗ 0.79 −0.37∗∗
(0.27) (0.24) (0.12) (0.12)
FMOLS −0.38∗ 1.63∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗ 0.66
(0.21) (0.23) (0.09)
CHN5 DOLS −0.75∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ −0.52∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.91 −0.37∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.08) (0.18) (0.15)
FMOLS −0.31∗ 1.97∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.70
(0.17) (0.21) (0.08) (0.18)
CHN6 DOLS −0.47 1.63∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗ 0.00 0.83 −0.47∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.36) (0.18) (0.36) (0.17)
FMOLS −0.53∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.50∗ 0.73
(0.25) (0.30) (0.12) (0.29)
CHN8 DOLS 0.95 1.71∗∗∗ 0.54 −0.20∗∗
(0.94) (0.42) (0.08)
FMOLS 0.64 1.61∗∗∗ 0.47
(0.85) (0.40)
CHN9 DOLS −0.92 1.12∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ 0.75 −0.25∗
(0.72) (0.30) (0.09) (0.15)
FMOLS −1.17∗ 1.04∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ 0.70
(0.61) (0.27) (0.09)
CHN10 DOLS 0.15 2.45∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 0.81 −0.24∗
(0.56) (0.25) (0.23) (0.14)
continued on next page
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FMOLS 0.07 2.20∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.62
(0.58) (0.28) (0.21)
CHN12 DOLS −0.54 1.90∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.84 −0.33∗
(0.55) (0.29) (0.08) (0.25) (0.20)
FMOLS −0.98∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.76
(0.48) (0.24) (0.08) (0.17)
CHN14 DOLS −0.90 1.64∗∗∗ −0.28∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.00 0.88 −0.33∗
(0.64) (0.41) (0.14) (0.27) (0.28) (0.20)
FMOLS −1.17∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ −0.17 0.77
(0.53) (0.27) (0.12) (0.17) (0.22)




CHN16 DOLS 1.42∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ 0.70 −0.28∗∗
(0.21) (0.09) (0.14)
FMOLS 1.41∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.66
(0.20) (0.08)
CHN20 DOLS 1.36∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗ −0.03 0.76 −0.30∗
(0.42) (0.16) (0.38) (0.15)
FMOLS 1.19∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗ −0.20 0.68
(0.33) (0.13) (0.27)
GER18 DOLS 1.04∗∗∗ −0.95∗∗∗ 0.85 −0.06
continued on next page
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(0.33) (0.13) (0.08)
FMOLS 0.93∗∗∗ −0.95∗∗∗ 0.83
(0.23) (0.08)
GER20 DOLS 1.09∗∗∗ −0.13 −0.96∗∗∗ 0.84 −0.05
(0.36) (0.29) (0.13) (0.09)
FMOLS 0.98∗∗∗ −0.16 −0.97∗∗∗ 0.83
(0.24) (0.23) (0.10)
IRL5 DOLS −0.11∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.17 0.89 −0.30∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.33) (0.08) (0.14) (0.11)
FMOLS −0.09∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.08 0.80
(0.02) (0.27) (0.06) (0.12)
ITA11 DOLS −2.44 −1.00 −1.70∗∗∗ 0.86 −0.03
(0.68) (1.37) (0.55) (0.08)
FMOLS −2.49 −0.91 −1.63∗∗∗ 0.82
(0.52) (0.96) (0.40)
JPN6 DOLS −1.12∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ −6.23∗∗∗ 0.92 −0.39∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.62) (0.20) (0.67) (0.14)
FMOLS −1.26∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ −5.58∗∗∗ 0.89
(0.19) (0.49) (0.17) (0.55)
JPN7 DOLS −1.04∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.10 −5.92∗∗∗ 0.92 −0.38∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.62) (0.19) (0.29) (0.99) (0.13)
FMOLS −1.21∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ −0.00 −5.70∗∗∗ 0.89
(0.18) (0.47) (0.17) (0.17) (0.71)
continued on next page
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0NFA TB NTT GOV TOT OPEN ¯ R2 α
JPN20 DOLS 2.19∗ 0.28 −6.43∗∗∗ 0.76 −0.22∗
(1.12) (0.26) (1.08) (0.11)
FMOLS 1.88∗∗ 0.31 −6.32∗∗∗ 0.73
(0.79) (0.20) (8.84)
KOR18 DOLS 0.11 −1.39∗∗∗ 0.76 −0.05
(0.23) (0.21) (0.08)
FMOLS 0.04 −1.46∗∗∗ 0.67
(0.23) (0.20)
NLD4 DOLS −0.20∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ 0.63 −0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.21) (0.10) (0.06)
FMOLS −0.19∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ −0.54∗∗∗ 0.59
(0.04) (0.18) (0.08)
SWE17 DOLS 0.87∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 0.93 −0.06
(0.13) (0.23) (0.45)
FMOLS 0.87∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 0.87
(0.13) (0.22)
US1 DOLS 0.05 2.68∗∗∗ 0.70 −0.17∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.55) (0.04)
FMOLS 0.03 2.70∗∗∗ 0.64
(0.19) (0.52)
US8 DOLS −6.78 0.25 0.83 −0.29∗∗∗
(1.37) (0.63) (0.08)
FMOLS −5.67 0.83∗∗ 0.78
continued on next page
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1NFA TB NTT GOV TOT OPEN ¯ R2 α
(1.00) (0.41)
US9 DOLS −5.60 0.90 0.19 0.85 −0.22∗∗
(1.46) (0.66) (0.12) (0.11)
FMOLS −4.80 1.22∗∗∗ 0.15 0.80
(0.91) (0.42) (0.11)




US16 DOLS 2.88∗∗∗ 0.25 0.77 −0.09
(0.45) (0.15) (0.07)
FMOLS 2.85∗∗∗ 0.23 0.66
(0.40) (0.15)
Note: Reported are only speciﬁcations, which fulﬁll the following three conditions: First, all series included in the speci-
ﬁcation are tested to be I(1) in the individual country’s unit root tests, secondly, the null hypothesis of no cointegration
is rejected at the 5% level according to MacKinnon critical values, and third, reer adjusts to deviations from long-run
equilibrium. ***,** and * denote the signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5, and 10%. ˆ α denotes the estimated adjustment parameter
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Figure 2: REER vs. BEER and Overvaluation in Percent, contd.
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